Electoral institutions, cabinet negotiations, and budget deficits within the European Union
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Electoral institutions, cabinet negotiations, and budget deficits within the European Union

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Published by Centre for Economic Policy Research in London .
Written in English


Book details:

Edition Notes

StatementMark Hallerberg and Jürgen von Hagen.
SeriesDiscussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research -- No.1555
ContributionsHagen, Jürgen von., Centre for Economic Policy Research.
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL19353629M

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Downloadable (with restrictions)! Two literatures in political economy argue that differences in political institutions help explain variation in the fiscal performance of countries. They indentify electoral systems and institutions that structure the formation of the budget as important determinants of the budget deficit. In this paper we indicate that these two arguments complement one ://   Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union Mark Hallerberg, Jürgen von Hagen. Chapter in NBER book Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance (), James M. Poterba and Jürgen von Hagen, editors (p. - ) Published in January by University of Chicago Press Get this from a library! Electoral institutions, cabinet negotiations, and budget deficits in the European Union. [Mark Hallerberg; Jürgen von Hagen; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- A rough consensus has emerged that states with proportional representation systems are likely to run larger deficits than plurality states. We argue that electoral institutions matter because they Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union. By Mark Hallerberg and Jürgen von Hagen. Abstract. Two literatures in political economy argue that differences in political institutions help explain variation in the fiscal performance of countries. They indentify electoral systems and institutions

Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages , National Bureau of Economic Research, :// Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union. NBER Working Paper No. w Number of pages: 40 Posted: 26 Aug Mark Hallerberg and Jürgen von Hagen. Emory University - Department of Political Science and University of Bonn - Institute of Economic Policy?per_id= Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union. CEPR Discussion Paper Series # Posted: 15 Apr Jürgen von Hagen and Mark Hallerberg. University of Bonn - Institute of Economic Policy and Emory University - Department of Political Science?per_id= 9. Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union Mark Hallerberg and Jürgen von Hagen Budgetary Institutions and the Levels of Expenditure Outcomes in Australia and New Zealand J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradham Budgetary Procedures—Aspects and Changes: New Evidence for Some European Countries

Hallerberg, M. and J. von Hagen (), ‘Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union’, in J. Poterba and J. von Hagen (eds), Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, – Google Scholar   Book manuscript, University of Pittsburgh. Google Scholar. Hallerberg, Mark and Jürgen von Hagen () ` Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union ', in James Poterba and Jürgen von Hagen (eds) Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pp. The European Union Explained. Essay about the european union business education ie (doc) explain origins of with reference to two theories international regulations on algorithmic decision making and a quot right explanation deepai enforcement eu law :// Hallerberg, M., J. Von Hagen () “Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union”, CEPR Discussion Paper # Google Scholar Heller, W. () “Divided Legislatures: The Budgetary Effect of Intercameral Partisan